Skyldulesning - Hvernig góð hugmynd varð að harmleik. Hættulegasta mynt í heimi?

Undanfarna þrjá daga hefur vefsíða Þýska blaðsins Der Spiegel birt afar fróðlegan greinarflokk um hvernig euroið kom til sögunnar, hvernig það þróaðist, hvernig flestar reglur í kringum það hafa verið þverbrotnar og hverjir eru framtíðarmöguleikar þess.

Greinarnar þrjár sem þýddar eru yfir á ensku úr þýsku, eru afar fróðlegar og ættu að vera skyldulesning öllum þeim sem fylgjast með alþjóðastjórnmálum og ekki síst Eurokrísunni sem skekur orðið stóran part heimsins.

Það er ekki síður ástæða til þess að hvetja Íslendinga sem eru að velta þvi fyrir sér hvernig gjaldmiðilsmálum þjóðarinnar sé best skipað til framtíðar (er það ekki næstum öll þjóðin nú orðið) að lesa greinina.  Þeir sem velta því fyrir sér hvort að hagstætt sé fyrir Íslendinga að ganga í Evrópusambandið fá líka með lestri greinanna nokkra innsýn hvernig hlutirnir ganga fyrir sig á þeirri eyrinni.

Hér að neðan eru hlekkir á greinarnar, og svo skeyti ég inn nokkrum áhugaverðum punktum.

1. Hvernig góð hugmynd varð að harmleik

2. Hvernig Eurosvæðið hirti ekki um eigin reglur.

3. Hvert stefnir Euroið?

 

The promises of the euro were recorded in the Maastricht Treaty. It was to be a currency that would make Europe strong in a competitive globalized world; that would bring the European economies closer together; that would oblige countries to limit their debts and deficits; that would guarantee that no country would be liable for the debts of another; and that would promote political unity.

And the details? Well, they would be ironed out later.

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Italy's government debt of 115 percent of GDP was dramatically higher than the 60 percent debt limit agreed to in the Maastricht Treaty. Belgium was also massively in violation of treaty provisions.

At the time, then-Bundesbank President Tietmeyer noted with concern that, in 1998, the Europeans, inspired by the sheer magnitude of their project, had eliminated the final test of whether enough countries even satisfied the requirements for the euro, from their roadmap for switching to the new currency. They were determined that the euro would be introduced on Jan. 1, 2002.

In a German government meeting that was supposed to make a decision on the currency, Tietmeyer raised his objections against certain euro candidates -- to no avail. In fact, the outcome of the meeting had already been determined in advance, and it had even been stated in writing.

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In 1992, for example, 62 German professors issued a joint warning against introducing the euro. They feared that the monetary union, the way it was structured, would "expose Western Europe to strong economic fluctuations, which, in the foreseeable future, could lead to a political acid test."

In the end, the political will prevailed over the economic objections. In April 1998, the two houses of the German parliament, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, which represents the interests of Germany's 16 states, cleared the way for the last step toward monetary union.

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Few within the European Commission openly criticized the loosening of the Maastricht rules. And the Germans, together with the French -- both facing the threat of an excessive debt procedure -- were too busy undermining the Maastricht Treaty. The two countries, determined not to submit to sanctions, managed to secure a majority in the EU's Council of Economic and Finance Ministers to cancel the European Commission's sanction procedure. It was a serious breach of the rules whose consequences would only become apparent later.

 

The German-French initiative effectively did away with the Stability and Growth Pact, which the Germans had forced their partners to sign. The consequences were fatal. If the two biggest economies in the euro zone weren't abiding by the rules, why should anyone else?

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The architects of the euro and their successors have lost the Maastricht Treaty bet. They have jeopardized an agreement made by 12 countries in the hope that the markets wouldn't notice how fragile their shiny new currency really is. And what the founders of the euro left in the way of loopholes in the original treaty -- which was aimed at providing a stable foundation for the common currency -- their successors have used in the course of 10 years to make the euro even more vulnerable.

In defiance of all rules, the euro countries have almost doubled their combined national debt since 1997. It has grown by close to €2 trillion, or 30 percent, in the last three years alone. Without the costs incurred as a result of the financial crisis, perhaps it would have taken longer for the bet to turn sour, but it would have done so nonetheless. The euro had too many design defects, the European political class was too weak to correct them, and Europeans themselves were too disinterested in the entire massive project.

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For a monetary union to function, the economies of its member states cannot drift too far apart, because it lacks the usual balancing mechanism, the exchange rate. Normally a country depreciates its currency when its economy falters. This makes its goods cheaper on the world market, allowing it to increase exports and thereby reduce its deficits. But this doesn't work in a monetary union. If one country doesn't manage its economy effectively, the common currency acts as a manacle.

If Greece were a state in a United States of Europe with a common fiscal and economic policy, it would be just as protected as the city-state of Bremen, also deeply in debt, is by the Federal Republic of Germany. But because there is no common European fiscal policy, Greece, as the weakest country in the European Union -- and despite the fact that it only contributes three percent to the total economic output of the euro countries -- becomes a systemic threat for 16 countries and 320 million Europeans. And the euro, intended as a means of protecting Europe against the imponderables of globalization, becomes the most dangerous currency in the world.

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"The current policy is to act as if a liquidity crisis could be overcome," says Rogoff, "and as if all it took were to hand out enough loans to jump-start growth once. But it's the wrong diagnosis. We have a solvency crisis, and we have European countries and regions that are fundamentally bankrupt. No loan in the world, no matter how big, will save Greece, nor will it save Portugal and probably not Ireland, either, and Italy is also very worrisome."

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In the end, only two possibilities will remain: a transfer union, in which the strong countries pay for the weak; or a smaller monetary union, a core Europe of sorts, that would consist of only relatively comparable economies.

A transfer and liability union requires new political institutions, and individual countries would have to confer a significant portion of their powers on Brussels. Some politicians are warming up to this idea as they consider an economic government or even a United States of Europe, but without explaining exactly what this means.

The second path is the more likely one. It will not be easier, and it might not be any less costly, either. First a firewall would have to be erected between the countries that are in fact insolvent and do not stand a chance of ever repaying their debts, like Greece, and others that have only a short-term liquidity problem. Then the banks would have to be provided with government funds, so that the financial system does not collapse when banks are forced to write off some of the government bonds on their balance sheets. Finally, the countries exiting the euro zone would require continued support, because Europe cannot simply look on as countries like Greece descend into chaos.

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